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the amendment was made under subsection (a) or (b). Notions of
fairness and expeditiousness, therefore, dictate permitting a party
to exercise his sole opportunity to amend as of right upon the re-
ceipt of the last responsive pleading. To require leave to amend
under CPLR 3025(b) would serve neither the interests of the liti-
gants nor judicial economy."'
James M. Ebetino
ARTICLE 45-EVIDENCE
CPLR 4502(b): Spousal privilege waived by commencement of
wrongful death action
CPLR 4502(b) generally prohibits compulsory disclosure of
confidential interspousal communications made in reliance upon
the marital relationship.' 9 It is well settled, however, that the priv-
"I See generally S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROcEss 269-328 (1975). An amendment
adding an additional theory of recovery based on the same transactions set forth in the origi-
nal complaint, without alleging new and essential facts, is likely to be permitted under
CPLR 3025(b). CPLR 3025(b), commentary at 479-80 (1974). The related claim, if otherwise
stale for statute of limitations purposes, is nevertheless timely by virtue of CPLR 203(e)
(1972). A claim that does not arise out of the transactions set forth in the original pleading,
therefore, will generally not be deemed interposed at the time of the original pleading. See,
e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. County Asphalt, Inc., 86 Misc. 2d 958, 382 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup.
Ct. Ulster County 1976); Werner Spitz Constr. Co. v. Vanderlinde Elec. Corp., 64 Misc. 2d
157, 314 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Monroe County Ct. 1970).
Although the issue has not arisen under the CPLR, several courts construing the CPA
indicated that additional claims set forth in amendments as of right always relate back to
the time of the original pleading, even if they arose from unrelated transactions. See
Guntzer v. County of Westchester, 273 App. Div. 2d 966, 966, 78 N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (2d Dep't),
af'd, 298 N.Y. 755, 83 N.E.2d 157 (1948); Webber v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 41 Misc. 2d 153,
153, 244 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963); Rusher Ford Sales, Inc. v. Glens
Falls Ins. Co., 32 Misc. 2d 468, 469, 223 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (Sup. Ct. Erie County), aff'd
mem., 16 App. Div. 2d 1034, 230 N.Y.S.2d 680 (4th Dep't 1962); McNaught v. Rosenfeld,
168 Misc. 888, 889, 6 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1938); In re Miller's
Will, 162 Misc. 563, 570-71, 295 N.Y.S. 943, 952 (Sur. Ct. Kings County), af'd mem., 252
App. Div. 872, 300 N.Y.S. 798 (2d Dep't 1937). Commentators have argued that such a
construction may continue to be applicable under the CPLR. H. WAc frELL, supra note 97,
at 144; 3 WK&M 3025.09.
119 CPLR 4502(b) (1963) provides:
A husband or wife shall not be required, or, without the consent of the other if
living, allowed, to disclose a confidential communication made by one to the other
during the marriage.
At common law, spouses were considered incompetent to testify for or against each
other. See RICHARoSON, EVIDENCE § 445 (10th ed. 1973); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227, 2236
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). By statute, New York, along with the majority of other juris-
dictions, removed the incompetency in most situations. See CPLR 4502(a), 4512 (1963). The
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ilege can be waived either by the failure to object timely or by con-
sent."'0 Recently, in Prink v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., ,21 the Court of
Appeals recognized an additional means of waiver when it held
that a spouse automatically waives the conjugal privilege by insti-
tuting an action for the wrongful death of her spouse. 12
The plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her husband,
Robert Prink, instituted a wrongful death action against the owners
and architects of a building in which the decedent had occupied an
office. 123 The plaintiff claimed that her husband's fatal fall from a
thirty-six story window had been caused by negligence in the de-
statutes of all other jurisdictions are collected at 2 WIGMORE § 488, supra.
The marital privilege . . . was founded upon a wise public policy, adopted
and pursued for the purpose of encouraging to the utmost that mutual confidence
between husband and wife which is the strongest guarantee of a happy mar-
riage. . . . The law appreciated the fact that even truth itself might be pursued
too keenly and might cost too much. The general evil of infusing reserve and dis-
simulation between parties occupying such relations to each other, would be too
great a price to pay for the chance of obtaining the truth in regard to some matter
under investigation.
People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484, 495-96, 35 N.E. 951, 954-55 (1894).
Although the conjugal privilege generally is not lost by the termination of the marital
relationship, whether by divorce or death of one of the parties, see 5 WK&M 4502.22, not
all the "daily and ordinary" conversations between spouses are protected. Only disclosures
that would not have been made "but for the absolute confidence in ... the marital relation-
ship" are covered by the privilege. People v. Melske, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 80, 176 N.E.2d 81, 83,
217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1961). Moreover, the courts have narrowly construed the meaning of
"confidential communications." See, e.g., People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174, 179, 216 N.E.2d
582, 584, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1966) (communications made in presence of third parties
not privileged); Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 315, 144 N.E.2d 72, 74, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102
(1957) (communication injuring spouse not privileged); Parkhurst v. Berdell, 110 N.Y. 386,
394, 18 N.E. 123, 127 (1888) (business matters discussed by spouses not privileged); People
v. Watkins, 63 App. Div. 2d 1033, 1034, 406 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (2d Dep't), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1033 (1978) (communications between spouses jointly advancing criminal conspiracy or
aiding commission of ongoing crime not privileged); The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 786,
810 (1977).
The marital privilege has been the focus of sharp attack. See, e.g., Hines, Privileged
Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CAL. L. REv. 390, 410-14 (1931);
Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of The Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1375 (1973).
Those who view the privilege as unjustified argue that the detrimental effect of the loss of
evidence occasioned by the invocation of the privilege is greater than the uncertain benefits
provided marital harmony. See Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675, 682-86 (1929); Note, The Husband-Wife
Evidentiary Privilege: Is Marriage Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 426-29.
110 See, e.g., Parkhurst v. Berdell, 110 N.Y. 386, 394, 18 N.E. 123, 127 (1888); Grobin v.
Grobin, 184 Misc.2d 996, 999, 55 N.Y.S.2d 32, 35 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1945).
121 48 N.Y.2d 309, 398 N.E.2d 517, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1979).
' Id. at 317, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
123 Id. at 313, 398 N.E.2d at 519, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
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sign and maintenance of the building. ' It was noted on Prink's
death certificate that his psychiatrist had reported to the medical
examiner that the decedent had been "acutely tense and de-
pressed," thereby raising the possibility that the death resulted
from suicide. '25 During an examination before trial, the plaintiff ad-
mitted that her husband had been seeing a psychiatrist, but in-
voked the marital privilege when questioned about any conversa-
tions she had had with her husband concerning his reasons for
having sought such treatment."6 Additionally, the plaintiff con-
ceded that she had spoken with her husband's psychiatrist follow-
ing the accident, but refused to reveal the substance of the conver-
sation, claiming the physician-patient privilege. '27 Upon the
defendants' motion, special term ordered the plaintiff to answer the
questions concerning her conversations with her husband and his
psychiatrist.'28 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed,
but certified the question to the Court of Appeals."9
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed.'30 Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Meyer' 3' initially determined that the information with-
held by Mrs. Prink was protected by both the physician-patient
and the marital privileges unless they had been waived.' 3 Noting
'" Id. at 313, 398 N.E.2d at 519-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14.
125 Id.
,"I Id. at 313, 398 N.E.2d at 519-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 914. See CPLR 3101(b) (1970)
("upon objection by a party privileged matter shall not be obtainable"); 3a WK&M
3101.40.
'27 48 N.Y.2d 309, 313-14, 398 N.E.2d 517, 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914. CPLR 4504 statu-
torily embodies the physician-patient privilege. CPLR 4504(c) creates sweeping exceptions to
the privilege, however, in cases where the mental condition of a deceased is in issue. See id.
In addition, it has been suggested that the Court's holding in Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d
287, 250 N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969), see note 138 and accompanying text infra, has
left the privilege with little, if any, practical use. See Barker, Toward a New York Evidence
Code: Some Notes on the Privileges, 19 N.Y.L.F. 791, 796-97 (1974).
"1 48 N.Y.2d at 314, 398 N.E.2d at 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
122 Id.
130 Id.
"I, In addition to Judge Meyer, the majority consisted of Judges Jasen, Jones and Wach-
tler. Chief Judge Cooke dissented in part in an opinion joined by Judge Gabrielli and Judge
Fuchsberg. Judge Fuchsberg also filed a brief separate opinion.
1 48 N.Y.2d at 314, 398 N.E.2d at 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 914. Since Mr. Prink's discus-
sion with his wife concerning his psychiatric treatment "would not have been made but for
the confidence induced by the marital relationship," id., Judge Meyer concluded that, in the
absence of waiver, the marital privilege was applicable. Id. The more difficult issue whether
the psychiatrist's conversation with his patient's wife was covered by the physician-patient
privilege also was answered in the affirmative because the psychiatrist's information had
been "acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity" and was "necessary to
enable [the psychiatrist] to act in that capacity." Id.; see CPLR 4504(a) (Pam. 1964-1979).
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that neither privilege is terminated by death'33 and that the psychi-
atrist's disclosures to the medical examiner and to Mrs. Prink did
not constitute a waiver of the physician-patient privilege,' 4 the
majority nevertheless held that both privileges had been waived by
the commencement of the wrongful death action.' s The Court ob-
served that the personal representative in a wrongful death action
essentially stands in the same posture as the decedent' 6 and there-
fore concluded that since Mr. Prink could not have asserted the
privileges had he survived and sued the defendant for his injuries,
neither could the plaintiff."7 Judge Meyer reasoned that the physi-
cian-patient privilege had been waived by relying upon the rule
that the "bringing [of] a personal injury action in which mental or
physical condition is affirmatively put in issue, . . . waives the
privilege."' 38 Balancing the unfairness of subjecting a defendant to
,W 48 N.Y.2d at 314, 398 N.E.2d at 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citing Davis v. Supreme
Lodge, Knights of Honor, 165 N.Y. 159, 58 N.E. 891 (1900); Southwick v. Southwick, 49
N.Y. 510, 518, (1872); CPLR 4504(c); RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 455 (10th ed. 1973); 8 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2341 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
,3 48 N.Y.2d at 314-15, 398 N.E.2d at 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 914. The majority observed
that since the physician-patient privilege belongs to the patient, the psychiatrist, "by his
sole fiat," could not effectuate a waiver without the consent of the holder of the privilege. Id.
at 314-15, 398 N.E.2d at 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15.
"I Id. at 315-18, 398 N.E.2d at 519-23, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 913-17.
138 Id. at 215-16, 398 N.E.2d at 521, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915. Wrongful leath actions may be
brought only pursuant to EPTL 5-4.1 (1967):
[flor a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent's death against
a person who would have been liable to the decedent by reason of such wrongful
conduct if death had not ensued.
137 48 N.Y.2d at 316, 398 N.E.2d at 521, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915. The Prink Court first
examined the decedent's use of the privilege against self-incrimination as a possible aid, see
CPLR 4501 (1963), but concluded that the privilege does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief
and at the same time withhold information relevant to his right to maintain an action. Id. at
316, 398 N.E.2d at 521, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915; see Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354,
363, 248 N.E.2d 419, 425, 300 N.Y.S.2d 555, 563 (1969); Laverne v. Incorporated Village of
Laurel Hollow, 18 N.Y.2d 635, 638, 219 N.E.2d 294, 295, 272 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782, appeal dis-
missed, 386 U.S. 682 (1966); Levine v. Bornstein, 6 N.Y.2d 892, 893, 160 N.E.2d 921, 921-22,
190 N.Y.S.2d 702, 702 (1959); Cronk v. Cayuga County Patrons' Fire Relief Ass'n, 90 Misc.
2d 945, 948, 396 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1977); 3 WK&M 3104.38-40.
"For essentially the same reason," the majority concluded that Mr. Prink could have in-
voked neither the physician-patient nor the marital privileges. 48 N.Y.2d at 316, 398 N.E.2d
at 521, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
13 48 N.Y.2d at 316-17, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916; see Koump v. Smith,
25 N.Y.2d 287, 294, 250 N.E.2d 857, 861, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858, 864 (1969). The Court took
judicial notice that "many apparently accidental deaths are in fact suicides." 48 N.Y.2d at
316-17, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916. The majority determined that an alleged fall
from a 36th story window was "sufficiently equivocal" so that a wrongful death action based
upon that act necessarily put the decedent's mental condition in issue. Id.; see Beeler v.
Hildan Crown Container Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 163, 164-65, 271 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (3d Dep't
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liability without providing him an opportunity to establish his in-
culpability'39 against the "real source" of the marital privilege,'
the Prink majority declared that "the better policy" would be to
hold that the spousal privilege also had been waived.'
Chief Judge Cooke dissented in part,"' arguing that the major-
ity's "abrogation" of the conjugal privilege "seriously undermines
the strong social policy supporting the privilege and marks an un-
explained departure from prior precedent." ' The dissent disputed
the majority's emphasis on the unfairness of permitting a party
seeking affirmative relief to invoke the privilege, since the legisla-
tive intent behind CPLR 4502(b) was that the preservation of the
marital relationship should outweigh any inequities that might re-
sult from the suppression of relevant evidence.' Observing that
the statute does not require the privilege to be asserted only defen-
sively,14 1 Chief Judge Cooke stated that the majority's decision
anomalously Drecludes plaintiffs from invoking the spousal privi-
lege but leaves defendants free "to defeat a meritorious claim by
1966).
,"1 48 N.Y.2d at 316-18, 398 N.E.2d at 521-23, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915-17; see Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
"1 48 N.Y.2d at 318, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17. Addressing the justifi-
cations for the marital privilege, the majority adopted the theory set forth in McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 86 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972):
[W]hile the danger of injustice from suppression of relevant proof is clear and cer-
tain, the probable benefits of the rule of privilege in encouraging marital confi-
dences and wedded harmony, is at best doubtful and marginal.
Probably the policy of encouraging confidences is not the prime influence in
creating and maintaining the privilege. It is really a much more natural and less
devious matter. It is a matter of emotion and sentiment. All of us have a feeling of
indelicacy and want of decorum in prying into the secrets of husband and wife. It
is important to recognize that this is the real source of the privilege. When we do,
we realize at once that this motive of delicacy, while worthy and desirable, will not
stand in the balance with the need for disclosure in court of facts upon which a
man's life, liberty, or estate may depend.
"1 48 N.Y.2d at 317, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
12 Id. at 318-21, 398 N.E.2d at 523-25, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 917-19 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Cooke agreed with the affirmance of that part of special term's order requiring
the plaintiff to disclose the contents of her discussion with the psychiatrist. Id. at 318, 398
N.E.2d at 523, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 319, 398 N.E.2d at 523, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N.Y. 181, 30 N.E. 393 (1892)).
"1 48 N.Y.2d at 320-21, 398 N.E.2d at 524, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Cooke, C.J.,
dissenting).
1,5 Id. Chief Judge Cooke stated that the majority's decision leaves litigants confronted
with a "Hobson's choice" of either "betray[ing] the trust and confidence of one's spouse or
forego[ing] one's right to seek redress for a grievous wrong." Id.
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hiding behind the same privilege." '
It appears that the Prink holding nullifies the availability of
the conjugal privilege to any party in a civil action seeking affirma-
tive relief.147 Although Prink involved an action sounding in tort, it
would seem that the scope of the decision could embrace all cate-
gories of litigation. For example, a party seeking to recover for
breaoh of contract could be compelled, under Prink, to disclose any
statement, otherwise protected by the marital privilege, that may
have a bearing on the outcome of the controversy. It is suggested,
however, that marital harmony should not be disturbed when the
information sought can be derived from other sources or where it is
neither dispositive of the case nor crucial to a party's defense.1 8
"I4 Id. Judge Fuchsberg concurred in Chief Judge Cooke's dissent, but added a separate
memorandum to note that continued support of the marital privilege is mandated by the
"psychological and sociological human need for someone in whom to confide and the growing
recognition of the constitutional right of privacy." Id. at 322, 398 N.E.2d at 525, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-15 (1973);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86
(1965); Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congress-
man, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 48; Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Exami-
nation of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CAL.
L. REv. 1353, 1375 (1973). Professor Krattenmaker maintains that privileges are protectors of
the right of privacy and that they play a substantial role in effectuating the underlying
rights of both privacy and freedom of speech. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Priv-
ileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L. Rav. 613,
651-57 (1976).
"1 48 N.Y.2d at 320, 398 N.E.2d at 524, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 918. (Cooke, C.J., dissenting);
see id. at 316-18, 398 N.E.2d at 521-23, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915-17. Prior to Prink, the courts
made no distinctions based upon the spouse's position in the litigation. See People v. Hayes,
140 N.Y. 484, 496, 35 N.E. 951, 954 (1894); Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N.Y. 181, 183, 30
N.E. 393, 394 (1892). Although the physician-patient privilege is waived by any party who
affirmatively places his mental or physical condition in issue, Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d
287, 294, 250 N.E.2d 857, 861, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858, 864 (1969), it is submitted that a similar
rule is inappropriate where the conjugal privilege is involved. The marital privilege was de-
rived from the common-law notion that spouses were incompetent witnesses against one an-
other. RICHARDSON, supra note 119, § 445. By statute, New York abrogated the incompetency
except as to confidential communications. See id. § 446. The physician-patient privilege,
however, had no basis in the common law. Id. § 426. Indeed, New York was the first jurisdic-
tion to enact a statute creating the privilege. See id. Furthermore, it is suggested that the
justification for the physician-patient privilege-to encourage full disclosure in order to pro-
mote effective medical treatment-is not as compelling as that for the spousal privilege-to
strengthen and preserve the institution of marriage. Id. §§ 428, 447. Thus, it is submitted
that, unlike the physician-patient privilege, the historical and policy considerations underly-
ing the conjugal privilege outweigh the need for relevant evidence so that the mere com-
mencement of an action should not require a spouse to reveal communications made in reli-
ance upon the trust inherent in the marital relationship.
'" See 48 N.Y.2d at 321, 398 N.E.2d at 524, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Cooke, C.J., dissent-
ing). It is submitted that in order to preserve the legislative policy considerations supporting
the conjugal privilege, the majority could have adopted Chief Judge Cooke's suggestion to
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By redefining the rationale underlying the adoption of the
spousal privilege,"' it is submitted that the Prink majority substi-
tuted its judgment for that of the legislature and thereby produced
an unfortunate precedent. 5 ' Perhaps legislative action reaffirming
the social policies supporting the privilege is necessary. In the ab-
sence of such corrective legislation, however, it appears unlikely
that the marital privilege will afford a significant amount of protec-
tion to future litigants."'
Patricia C. Tuohy
allow the factfinder to draw an adverse inference from the plaintiff's invocation of the privi-
lege. See id.
" See id. at 317-18, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17. Both legislative and
historical support for the privilege, see Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and
Family Laws, [1962] N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 34, at 119, 145; RICHARDSON, note 119 supra, § 477,
as well as prior case law, see Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 315, 144 N.E.2d 72, 73, 165
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (1957); People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484, 496, 35 N.E. 951, 954-55 (1894);
Warner v. Press Publication Co., 132 N.Y. 181, 183, 30 N.E. 393, 394 (1892), recognized that
the conjugal privilege grew out of the desire to protect the marital relationship. See note 119
supra. Prink, however, indicates that the privilege was based more on an "emotion[al]" or
"sentiment[al]" reluctance to "pr[y] into the secrets of [a] husband and wife." 48 N.Y.2d at
317-18, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17 (quoting MCCORMCK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 86 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).
150 Although the legislature does not possess exclusive substantive lawmaking power
within the New York constitutional framework, legislative lawmaking takes precedence over
judicial lawmaking. See N.Y.CoNST. art. III, § 1. See also CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STAT-
urs § 158, at 245 (1940); DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-12
(1975). Thus, once the legislature has spoken, a court may not substitute its will for that of
the legislature. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 488, 95 N.E.2d 806, 811, aff'd sub nom.
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1950); see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478
(1970); Bryant Park Building, Inc. v. Frutkin, 10 Misc. 2d 198, 202, 167 N.Y.S.2d 184, 189
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1957). Rather, a court must interpret a statute so as to further the "poli-
cies which [the] legislature evidently had in mind." Maida v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 66 App. Div. 2d 852, 853, 411 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (2d Dep't 1978). See SANDS, SUTHER-
LAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.03 (4th ed. 1972).
There exist specific statutory exceptions to the marital privilege. See N.Y. FAMLY CT.
ACT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 1975) (privilege not available in proceeding involving child
abuse or neglect); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 23.01(b) (McKinney 1978) (privilege not availa-
ble in hearing for involuntary admission of drug dependent person); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §
384-b(3)(h)(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (privilege not available in proceeding to terminate
parental rights). It is submitted that these statutes represent a legislative determination
that only in such situations does public policy mandate a restriction of the spousal privilege.
"I It is conceivable that the Prink holding may survive future judicial scrutiny by being
restricted to its facts. For instance, it would seem plausible that the Court later may inter-
pret Prink as precluding the invocation of the spousal privilege in wrongful death actions
only where either the physical or mental condition of a deceased spouse is in issue.
